31 diciembre 2010

MILA -Mercado Integrado Latinoamericano

El 24 de diciembre se publicó en El Peruano la Ley 29638 aprobada por el Congreso de la República que modifica el artículo 137° y el ínciso d) del artículo 226° del Decreto Legislativo N° 861, Ley de Mercado de valores, para igualar en el país las condiciones para el pago de impuestos en las inversiones en acciones nacionales y extranjeras con el objetivo de facilitar la integración corporativa entre Bolsas de Valores y la integración corporativa entre instituciones y liquidación de valores.



Con esto se superó el impase para continuar con la integración de las Bolsas de Valores de Colombia, Chile y Perú. Las tres bolsas que conforman el Mercado Integrado Latinoamericano (MILA) conformarán el mayor número de compañías con títulos inscritos (563) y ocupan el tercer lugar en cuanto a volumen de transacciones (300 millones de dólares diarios en promedio).

Cada una de las tres bolsas tiene su énfasis. La bolsa peruana se centra en títulos relacionados con la minería, la de Colombia con los hidrocarburos y el sector financiero, y la chilena con energía, comercio y servicios.

Creo que es una buena estrategia de crecimiento, toda vez que para los mercados brasileños o mexicanos, nuestras economías separadas son pequeñas. Juntos nos convertiremos en una alternativa interesante de cara a captar las inversiones extranjeras. Los principales beneficiados serán aquellas empresas que extiendan sus operaciones en los países vecinos, claro...según la rentabilidad que le produzcan.

Como sucedió en Chile, el crecimiento sostenido de la economía nacional traerá consigo el acumulamiento de capital... esto a su vez provocará que empresas peruanas empiecen a "salir del barrio" para obtener otras buenas oportunidades de inversión así como diversificar su riesgo.

El 28 de octubre del 2010, la Asociación de Egresados de la Universidad del Pacífico y la Asociación de Graduados de la PUCP presentaron la Conferencia: Integración de las Bolsas de Lima. La exposición estuvo a cargo de Santiago Luis Ugarelli MSc. conocedor del tema.

El PPT de la presentación, se puede apreciar aquí , o vía Scribd:

El vídeo de la presentación :



Links relacionados:

24 diciembre 2010

Vídeos sobre la Navidad

La navidad, entre otras cosas, trae consigo la publicidad. Aquí algunos vídeos que han estado dando que hablar en Youtube...




































12 diciembre 2010

Cables en WikiLeaks sobre Perú

Los papeles del Departamento de Estado Americano sobre Perú publicados en WikiLeaks y divulgados en el Diario El País de España;

TEXTO DE REFERENCIA: Cable sobre la corrupción en el Ejército peruano

Informe sobre los pagos que realiza el narcotráfico a mandos del Ejército peruano para que la lucha contra el terrorismo no interfiera en sus actividades

ID:

196642

Date:

2009-03-12 21:57:00

Origin:

09LIMA345

Source:

Embassy Lima

Classification:

SECRET//NOFORN

Dunno:

09LIMA1640 09LIMA1865

Destination:

VZCZCXYZ0002
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHPE #0345/01 0712157
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 122157Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY LIMA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0184
INFO RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION PRIORITY 2218
RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA PRIORITY 6422
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PRIORITY 8150
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES PRIORITY 3709
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS PRIORITY 1348
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ MAR 5117
RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO PRIORITY 9687
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO PRIORITY 2393
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO PRIORITY 2234
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUMIAAA/USCINCSO MIAMI FL PRIORITY


S E C R E T LIMA 000345

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/13/2034
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PINR, PTER, SNAR, KCRM, PE
SUBJECT: ALLEGED ARMY CORRUPTION -- A PERSPECTIVE

REF: A. LIMA 1865
B. IIR 6 876 0037 08
C. LIMA 1640
D. IIR 6 876 0018 09

Classified By: Amb. P. Michael McKinley. Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

1. (S/NF) Introduction and Summary: The Garcia
Administration's efforts to combat narcotrafficking have been
stronger than under past administrations, and have included a
National Anti-Drug Strategy partly supported with government
funds, solid progress combatting coca production in the Upper
Huallaga Valley, and better police cooperation. And while
corruption has long plagued Peruvian government institutions,
few observers believe the problem today is anywhere near as
deep or extensive as during the shadowy (1990-2000) reign of
former President Fujimori's intelligence chief Vladimiro
Montesinos. xxxxxxxxxxxx has claimed to Poloffs that remnants of
the Montesinos narco-corruption web still exist within the
military. xxxxxxxxxxxx argues that some senior military
officials receive lucrative payoffs from drug traffickers
operating in the Apurimac and Ene River Valley (VRAE), which
is also the base of one of the most important remnants of the
Shining Path guerrillas. xxxxxxxxxxxx contends that the army -- for
fear of disrupting these drug trafficking networks and losing
access to payoffs -- is unwilling to commit the large force
needed to pacify the VRAE. As a result, xxxxxxxxxxx argues, ongoing
military operations against the Shining Path are destined to
fall short. Some of xxxxxxxxxxxx accusations are corroborated
by other Embassy contacts, press reports, and internal
documents as well as circumstantial evidence. Although the
xxxxxxxxxxxx clearly has an axe to grind against xxxxxxxxxxxx, the evidence calls for close monitoring. In the
meantime, it is apparent that Defense Minister Antero Flores
Araoz is continuing to push the military to build on and
expand new counter-terrorism efforts in the VRAE. (Note:
This cable focuses on military, rather than police corruption
because the military retains principal authority in the VRAE.
The military's recent operations against the Shining Path in
the VRAE are discussed Septel. End Note.) End Introduction
and Summary.

Army Command Dismantles Military Operations in the VRAE (2004)
--------------------------------------------- ------------
2. (S/NF) Corruption has long plagued Peruvian government
institutions, including the security services -- military,
police and judicial. Former President Alberto Fujimori's
(1990-2000) intelligence chief Vladimiro Montesinos, for
example, collaborated with top army and other security
officials to develop a web of protection for favored drug
traffickers while cooperating with U.S. officials to combat
others. To many observers, that was Peru's "heyday" of
narco-corruption -- a time when the government of Peru verged
on becoming a kind of "narco-state" in which those who
controlled the main criminal trafficking networks were in
fact high government officials. While most observers
acknowledge that Peru has come a long way since that time,
sharply reducing the extent of such subterranean influences,
few believe that drug-related corruption has been eliminated
and some believe it may now again be on the rise.
xxxxxxxxxxx argues that significant elements
of this corrupt network continue to exist and to operate --
now under the control of second-tier officers from the
Montesinos period.

3. (S/NF) Many of xxxxxxxxxx principle accusations
stem from corruption xxxxxxxxxx says xxxxxxxxxxx witnessed xxxxxxxxxx in Ayacucho (which includes part of
the VRAE). At that time xxxxxxxxxx launched a
counter-insurgency operation that xxxxxxxxxx claimed some senior army
officers later dismantled when it threatened their own
corrupt interests. xxxxxxxxxx used a small salary
increase approved by then-President Alejandro Toledo to
recruit auxiliary troops from local self-defense groups in
the VRAE to build xxxxxxxxxxxx forces from 300 to 3,500 troops.
xxxxxxxxxx deployed these troops to small bases of about 100
soldiers each, spread throughout the VRAE in Ayacucho.
xxxxxxxxxxx told Poloff xxxxxxxxxxx such bases would be better
positioned to resist insurgents and drug traffickers than the
isolated outposts of five to seven soldiers -- the model in
use at the time -- who regularly accepted bribes rather than
risk confronting superior forces. (A variety of articles and
investigative news programs from 2004 confirmed this
de scription xxxxxxxxxxxx.)

4. (S/NF) xxxxxxxxxxx however, the army
xxxxxxxxxxx dismantled xxxxxxxxxxx and reduced troop levels to
700. xxxxxxxxxxxx threatened lucrative sales of excess fuel by senior army
officers to drug traffickers. xxxxxxxxxxxx

Excess Fuel Scandal Implicates Top Generals (2006)
--------------------------------------------- -----
5. (S/NF)xxxxxxxxxxx the excess military fuel
scandal that erupted in 2006 is linked to the army's drug
trafficking ties in the VRAE. The scandal broke when the
press denounced a scheme by some senior generals to request
hundreds of thousands of gallons of fuel in 2006 for sale and
personal enrichment. xxxxxxxxxxx that about half this fuel
was sold to companies like Repsol, while the rest, in the
form of kerosene, was sold to drug traffickers in the VRAE.
One prominent counter-narcotics analyst told Poloff he had
seen evidence that the military had sold kerosene to drug
traffickers in northern Peru, and -- although he did not have
evidence -- believed it plausible they have also sold to
traffickers in the VRAE. Prosecutors have since implicated
dozens of Generals in the scheme to commercialize fuel,
including then Army commander Cesar Reinoso -- who was forced
to resign -- and his replacement Edwin Donayre. Reinoso
later claimed that the scheme was nothing new and that nearly
all senior generals participated. (Note: Officers are
officially provided periodic fuel allotments, usually more
than can be reasonably consumed, and consider this a
perquisite that complements their base salary. End Note.)
Army Commanding General Donayre retired from the military on
December 5 -- putatively for his politically inflammatory
comments relating to Chile (Ref A) -- but in the view of some
observers for other reasons as well, including his alleged
involvement in the fuel skimming scheme. xxxxxxxxxx

6. (S/NF) Peru's Public Ministry is currently investigating
the fuel scandal, so far without results. In a series of
recent articles published in the political weekly "Caretas,"
prominent investigative journalist Gustavo Gorriti has
alleged an army cover-up. Gorriti reported that General
Donayre declined to meet Public Ministry investigators on six
separate occasions, and that he reassigned the army's
internal inspector to a remote jungle posting after the
inspector issued a damning report on the scandal. Gorriti
also reported that the GOP's independent Comptroller in 2008
completed an investigation that said the military used clumsy
counterfeit documentation to "justify" over $2 million in
excess fuel. xxxxxxxxxxx told Poloffs that the army is
withholding internal accounting documents that would help
prove the investigators case. xxxxxxxxxxx gave Poloff what xxxxxxxxx said
were copies of these documents, marked "Secret", that showed
hundreds of thousands of gallons of "extraordinary fuel"
allotments to various generals in 2004 and 2005.

Cocaine Exported Via Army Base in Northern Peru (2004)
--------------------------------------------- ------
7. (S/NF) xxxxxxxxxxx told Poloff he believed a drug
trafficking operation uncovered by police in 2004 at an army
base in Piura in northern Peru was also linked to some senior
military officials and drugs exiting the VRAE. According to
a series of investigative reports by a prominent newspaper, a
junior officer gave traffickers linked to a Mexican cartel
free rein to use the base and its military vehicles to
transit cocaine shipments to a military port where the navy
ran a fish-packing operation. At the port, the traffickers
packed the drugs in with the fish for export. In the 2004
bust, police captured 700 kg of cocaine. The commander of
the base at the time, General Williams Zapata -- now Peru's
representative at the Inter-American Defense Board in
Washington -- refused to comment beyond claiming that the
military was not involved with drug trafficking.
xxxxxxxxxx however, told Poloff
that the implicated junior officer as well as another
perpetrator privately alleged that both General Zapata and
another unnamed senior general had participated in the drug
operation. (Note: Currently, the junior officer is detained
in Brazil, awaiting possible extradition, and the other
offender is in prison in Piura awaiting trial. End Note.)

8. (S/NF) xxxxxxxxx saw signs that
officers may have continued to cooperate with drug
traffickers. His main suspicion surrounded a visit to the
base that year by the Director of the National Chamber of
Fishing of Piura, Rolando Eugenio Velasco Heysen, to meet
regional Army commander General Paul da Silva. xxxxxxxxxx
speculated that Da Silva and Velasco -- who was arrested in
October 2007 for attempting to export 840 kilograms of
cocaine hidden in frozen fish -- were coordinating drug
shipments. An investigative journalist later reported that
both Da Silva and General Edwin Donayre had met with Velasco,
but that Velasco claimed he was merely promoting the
consumption of high-protein squid by the army. xxxxxxxxxxxxx
claims this argument makes no sense because the Generals'
meetings with Velasco occurred outside the time of year that
the Army signs new contracts.

Counter-Drug Analysts on Possible Narco-Army Links
--------------------------------------------- -----
9. (S/NF) A prominent Peruvian counter-drug analyst who
travels regularly to the VRAE agreed with the assessment that
some senior army commanders were complicit with drug
trafficking. He further believed the military was beginning
to recuperate the political power that it had in the 1990s
under President Alberto Fujimori's spy chief Vladimiro
Montesinos, when senior military officers worked
surreptitiously and closely with (certain) drug traffickers.
This analyst said that on his last trip to the VRAE, a local
mayor told him the military controlled all the main riverine
drug routes, and that officers charged protection money
rather than staunch the flow. A second analyst who travels
regularly to the VRAE said he had clear evidence that the
military controlled at least one major drug route (through
Cayramayo) and charged bribes from passing drug traffickers.

10. (S/NF) The analysts also highlighted the case of a drug
plane that crashed in October 2007 while trying to take off
from a clandestine airstrip in VRAE. According to a report
in the left-of-center newspaper La Republica, the airstrip
was located in direct view of a military base. The paper's
local sources said that no plane could take off or land
without being spotted from the base. The first analyst said
his sources in the area told him the army had actually built
the airstrip. According to a DAO source, after the plane
crashed, an army unit sought to destroy any evidence by
cutting up the wreckage and dumping it in the river (Ref B).
The national police received a tip about the army's actions
and recovered the plane, but did not report the incident in
order to avoid inflaming already tense relations with the
military. Army sources told La Republica, however, that the
plane was the first they had ever discovered in the area and
that they immediately reported it to the police.

Implications for Military Operations in the VRAE
--------------------------------------------- ---
11. (S/NF) xxxxxxxxxxx several analysts argued
that the military are reluctant to implement a serious plan
to pacify the VRAE because the payoffs from drug traffickers
are too profitable. These contacts dismissed the recent
Operation Excellence in Vizcatan (Ref C and Septel) as too
small to have any real impact in such a large and harsh
terrain. The operation may temporarily displace Shining Path
cells, they said, but it will not deter drug traffickers.
One analyst described the operation as a smokescreen designed
to deflect increasing political pressure on the army to show
results. Another analyst argued that the operation appeared
to be a serious effort to decapitate Shining Path while at
the same time avoiding the disruption of profitable drug
trafficking routes. xxxxxxxxxxx

Comment: A Series of Worrying Indicators
----------------------------------------
12. (S/NF) xxxxxxxxxx the limited and tentative progress by the
military in the VRAE to date does give some plausibility to
xxxxxxxxxx argument that the some army officials may not support the
larger objectives of the ongoing operations in the VRAE. We
will continue to closely monitor evidence of drug corruption
in the military and to encourage the government to
consolidate and expand on the first steps taken during
Operation Excellence.
MCKINLEY

TEXTO DE REFERENCIA: Cable sobre el plan peruano para derrotar al narcotráfico

Perú informa a los estadounidenses de un ambicioso plan militar, policial y social en varias zonas del país, entre ellas el Valle de los Ríos Apurimac y Ene, consideradas santuario de los narcotraficantes peruanos y la guerrilla de Sendero Luminoso

ID:

126100

Date:

2007-10-17 17:04:00

Origin:

07LIMA3429

Source:

Embassy Lima

Classification:

CONFIDENTIAL

Dunno:


Destination:

VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHPE #3429/01 2901704
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 171704Z OCT 07
FM AMEMBASSY LIMA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7146
INFO RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 5167
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 7627
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 0843
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ OCT QUITO 1513
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 1536
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUMIAAA/CDR USCINCSO MIAMI FL


C O N F I D E N T I A L LIMA 003429

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/22/2017
TAGS: PGOV, MARR, KICC, PREL, PE
SUBJECT: MOD BRIEFS SECRETARY GATES ON PLANS TO ENHANCE
INTERNAL SECURITY


Classified By: Charge James Nealon, for Reasons 1.4 (c,d)

1. (C) Summary: Senior MOD officials, including Minister of
Defense Alan Wagner, briefed Secretary of Defense Robert
Gates on operational plans to expand the government's control
over four isolated areas of Peru: the Apurimac and Ene river
valleys (the VRAE); the upper Huallaga valley; the border
with Columbia; and the northern coast of Peru. All four
operational plans combine targeted security operations with
increased investment in health, transportation, and education
to re-establish the presence of the state and win the support
of local populations. The briefing emphasized the importance
of Plan VRAE, which is fully funded and in the process of
being implemented; the other three programs remain in the
planning stage. End Summary.


-------------------------------------
A Multi-Faceted Approach -- Plan VRAE
-------------------------------------

2. (C) On October 5, Minister of Defense Wagner and senior
defense officials briefed Secretary of Defense Gates on the
GOP's plans to enhance security and state authority within
Peru's borders. The GOP has given top priority to Plan VRAE,
which seeks to re-establish order and combat the presence of
narcotraffickers and Shining Path terrorists in the four
departments comprising the Apurimac and Ene river valleys,
Junin, Cuzco, Huancavelica, and Ayacucho. The VRAE produces
50 percent of Peru's cocaine and is currently under a state
of emergency. More than 200,000 persons live in the area: 30
percent are illiterate, 50 percent malnourished, and 80
percent live in homes lacking both water and electricity. In
response, the government of Peru has secured funding to build
electrical plants, roads, water pipelines, and telephone
connections in 2007 and 2008. An interagency committee,
representing 11 ministries and the office of the vice
president, supervises social development and cooperates with
the military to increase the presence of security forces in
the region and to control the lawlessness that has allowed
the cocaine economy to predominate.

-----------------------------------
Putumayo, Huallaga, and Costa Norte
-----------------------------------

3. (C) A low level of economic development also afflicts
the 10,000 persons living along the 1300 kilometer border
with Colombia that follows the Putumayo River. Approximately
80 percent of the population lives in poverty, 70 percent in
extreme poverty. More than 80 percent of villagers are
illiterate, and more than 95 percent of homes lack
electricity and water. The goal of Plan Putumayo is to
integrate the region within the larger Peruvian economy by
constructing roads and airports, by building primary schools,
and by ending smuggling across the border. At the same time,
the plan recognizes the need to send additional troops to the
area, possibly an additional army battalion in 2008, to aid
the 2500 soldiers already posted. The long border and dense
vegetation pose challenges for troops patrolling the region,
particularly since the isolated bases in the area lack the
logistical support necessary to sustain operations.

4. (C) From 70 to 80 percent of Peru's cocaine transits
through the northern coast, where small fishing villages
supply vessels to transport drugs to larger ships. Plan
Costa Norte seeks to enhance the navy's ability to survey and
patrol waters along Peru's north coast by coordinating
surface and air operations and by pooling intelligence
sources from the military, national police, and Ministry of
Fishing. The GOP expects that increased cooperation will not
only reduce drug smuggling but also have an impact on
curtailing piracy, illegal fishing, and human trafficking.
The MOD noted, however, that at present, the military lacks
the resources necessary to monitor the illegal activity
taking place.

5. (C) Like the VRAE, the Huallaga valley contains a
Sendero Luminoso column -- estimated at 60 persons -- who
have increased their involvement in drug trafficking and have
launched attacks against security personnel. Plan VRAE aims
to eliminate the threat posed by Sendero Luminoso by
bolstering the presence of the police and by increasing
investment in basic infrastructure in order to create a
vibrant local economy that will undercut the appeal of drug
trafficking.

-------------
GOP Wish List
-------------

6. (C) Minister Wagner concluded the presentation by noting
eight areas where the United States could provide aid to the
GOP. Three involved military assistance: increased training
in the US for Peruvian military officers; access to US
satellite imagery; and funding to allow the Peruvian navy to
participate in multi-national operations. Five requests
involved bilateral assistance: the donation of a field
hospital to assist earthquake victims; additional funding to
assist Peruvian participation in international peacekeeping;
support for demining efforts along the Ecuadorian border;
re-establishment of the bilateral riverine program; and
funding to help improve naval interdictions along the
northern coast.

7. (C) In response to questions raised about Plan Putumayo,
Wagner said that cooperation with Columbia is excellent --
the two sides have a treaty allowing "hot pursuit" across the
border -- and the FARC has not yet established a permanent
presence on Peruvian soil, although efforts to recruit local
youths continue. Wagner noted that there are simply not
enough police along the Putumayo river, where thick jungle
makes any kind of travel difficult. Wagner also said that a
lack of air mobility, particularly in the mountainous VRAE,
hampers military operations. In the VRAE, for example, only
one military helicopter is operational. The situation is
different in the Upper Huallaga, where NAS air assets fully
support police patrols.

-------
Comment
-------

8. (C) The MOD deserves credit for identifying
transnational threats of terrorism and drug smuggling within
Peru's borders as the key security challenge facing the
government. Wagner recognizes as well that a purely military
approach to re-establishing state control is likely to fail,
and he has pursued a multi-faceted approach that responds to
the underlying social and economic causes of unrest. Still,
the greatest challenge for the GOP is to translate
well-meaning and crucial strategic plans into concrete
action. Plan VRAE, for example, was launched in December
2006 and has yet to get off the ground. The three other
plans are still on the drawing boards, with the laborious
process of obligating funds still pending. President Alan
Garcia's first year in office has shown that while securing
funding is a necessary first step in creating change, much
will depend on implementation.
NEALON

TEXTO DE REFERENCIA: Cable sobre el rescate de soldados

La Embajada en Lima informa en 2009 del rescate de cinco soldados que habían sido raptados por Sendero Luminoso

ID:

223894

Date:

2009-09-04 21:01:00

Origin:

09LIMA1309

Source:

Embassy Lima

Classification:

CONFIDENTIAL

Dunno:

09LIMA1299

Destination:

VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHPE #1309/01 2472101
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 042101Z SEP 09
FM AMEMBASSY LIMA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1176
INFO RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION 0010
RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 0018
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 8517
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 4093
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 1496
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ SEP MONTEVIDEO 9816
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO 0011
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 0009
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUMIAAA/USCINCSO MIAMI FL


C O N F I D E N T I A L LIMA 001309

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/03/2019
TAGS: PTER, SNAR, SOCI, PGOV, MOPS, PE
SUBJECT: VRAE: GOP MOUNTS RESCUE OP FOR STRANDED SOLDIERS

REF: LIMA 1299

Classified By: DCM James Nealon for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).

1. (C) Summary: At approximately 1100 hrs on September 4,
Peruvian armed forces successfully overcame small arms fire,
weather delays and capability limitations, and rescued five
wounded soldiers stranded in the aftermath of the September 2
Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso, SL) attack on a Peruvian air
force (FAP) helicopter (ref). The attack and rescue are
perceived as symbolically significant and government troops
remain in the area and continue to battle SL forces. Major
challenges include the area's rough terrain, altitude, and
topography, in addition to security forces' lack of
intelligence, logistical lift and proper equipment. The US
provided only modest support to the rescue operation, despite
prominent political leaders public call for US assistance.
End summary.

2. (C) Peruvian armed forces successfully overcame daunting
obstacles, including intense small arms fire, to rescue by
air five wounded soldiers trapped in the wake of the
September 2 SL skirmish and subsequent attack on a Peruvian
air force (FAP) helicopter. The bodies of the three KIA crew
members still remain at the site, along with the rest of the
patrol (reportedly around 20-30). Military contacts indicate
that an additional group of 50-odd combat soldiers arrived
over land from Huachocolpa on September 3 to reinforce the
besieged original patrol.

Observations
-------------
3. (C) The September 2 latest attack is significant: after
several previous attempts, this is the first time since 1999
SL has downed a helicopter. Besides the high-profile blow,
the importance of the successful rescue loomed large, since
experts acknowledge that a failure could have had a
devastating impact on soldiers' morale. Authorities are
uncertain on how the soldiers' continued engagement will
proceed given the troops' bare-bones logistical abilities
against an enemy who is more used to the area's rough
terrain, high altitude, and topography. Dense jungle make it
nearly impossible to spot SL columns' locations at any given
moment. Elevations of around 12,000 feet makes the use of
heavy armored helicopters unfeasible, even if the FAP had
them. The FAP is understandably wary of sending helicopters
back to the same location for fear of additional attacks, and
dropping special forces onto a neighboring hill could mean
several days of trekking over steep terrain to get to the
site of the attack.

4. (C) Embassy military and security experts are in contact
with their Peruvian counterparts, but operational security
(OPSEC) for the ongoing mission is tight. For this reason the
following information cannot be confirmed.

-- Since the original patrol was reinforced by another fifty
fresh troops (infantry or special forces), it suggests that
more ground reinforcements could be inserted to fight the SL
if needed.

-- The logic to remain engaged with the SL in this
strategically unimportant area only makes military sense if
the security forces are sufficiently strong enough to inflict
meaningful damage on the SL.

-- A knowledgeable analyst cautioned that SL could be
diverting security forces' attention away from its true next
target to some place else in the VRAE.

-- The medical evacuation of the five WIA soldiers was
accomplished via helicopter -- a dangerous proposition since
there is still thought to be up to four SL elements holding
the high ground above the government soldiers.

-- It is unclear if SL was able to recover the two
crew-served weapons (7.62 mm MAGs) and belts of ammunition
that were onboard the downed MI-17 helicopter.

-- We understand that the FAP and Army (EP) currently have no
more than five mission-capable MI-17s. None of these craft
are armored or configured as gunships.

-- Should the GOP security forces decide to persist in the
area, they will have to locate the enemy and then "shoot,
move and communicate" to prevent any other helicopters from
being shot down.

Political Ramifications:
------------------------
5. (C) Prominent political leaders publicly called for the
US to assist in the rescue operation. (Embassy assistance to
the rescue operation was limited to providing appropriate
recent satellite imagery, though the density of triple-canopy
jungle makes this imagery of limited use.) Police Director
General Manuel Hidalgo also inquired about the possible use
of NAS helicopters for the evacuation. We informed him that
altitude, weather and hostile conditions precluded the use of
NAS' UH-IIs for the mission. APRA Congressman (and former
President of Congress and the Congressional Defense
Committee) Luis Gonzales Posada remarked on September 3 that
Peru was being "abandoned by international cooperation" in
its fight against terrorism and narcotrafficking. Earlier in
the week, Defense Minister Rafael Rey made a similar remark,
saying it was a shame Peru did not have U.S. assistance in
the VRAE. Rey later backed off from some of his statements
in light of the Colombia DCA controversy that took place at
the Bariloche UNASUR meeting of presidents.

Comment: Another Wake-up Call?
------------------------------
6. (C) This incident illustrates once again the Peruvian
military's shortcomings in confronting the remnants of
Sendero Luminoso in the VRAE. To date, there has been little
indication that the GOP can be serious about investing
greater resources in the VRAE. The immediate
finger-pointing, whether aimed at us or at Peruvian political
actors, hampers the political debate and leaves the issues
unresolved until the next bloody skirmish. We have attempted
to assist the GOP in identifying and defining workable
solutions, and will continue to do so. End Comment.
MCKINLEY




TEXTO DE REFERENCIA: Cable sobre los planes de Sendero luminoso

En 2006, el jefe de los servicios de inteligencia de Perú explica al embajador peruano los planes de Sendero Luminoso

ID:

52989

Date:

2006-02-14 18:09:00

Origin:

06LIMA622

Source:

Embassy Lima

Classification:

SECRET

Dunno:

05LIMA5203 05LIMA5397

Destination:

P 141809Z FEB 06
FM AMEMBASSY LIMA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8733
INFO AMEMBASSY BOGOTA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY CARACAS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LA PAZ PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY QUITO PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO PRIORITY
AMCONSUL GUAYAQUIL PRIORITY
CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
DIA WASHDC PRIORITY


S E C R E T LIMA 000622


E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/09/2031
TAGS: PTER, PGOV, PE
SUBJECT: NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTOR'S BRIEFING ON
SENDERO LUMINOSO

REF: A. 05 LIMA 5397
B. 05 LIMA 5203

Classified By: D/Polcouns Art Muirhead for Reason 1.4 (B, D)

1. (S) SUMMARY. National Intelligence Directorate Chief
Julio Raygada sees SL as collaborating with the narcotics
trade, but does not consider the Senderistas to be simply
"narco-terrorists;" he asserts that the group remains
ideologically focused in its activities. Raygada points out
that in recent fatal attacks, SL employed its traditional
tactic of using a temporary strike force that fades back to
civilian cover. He believes SL intends to use this technique
to increase the pace of its "popular war" through selective
assassinations and armed take-overs of villages, eventually
carrying its struggle from the countryside to the cities.
There is increased SL political activity throughout the
country, including reinvigoration of regional committees, and
infiltration of vulnerable institutions. SL is thriving
militarily by preying on economic activity in Peru's
interior, not just from protecting narcotics trafficking, but
also through bribes from illegal loggers, fuel smugglers,
fruit growers and sugar producers. END SUMMARY.

2. (C) Ambassador received a briefing on 1/26 from DINI
(National Intelligence Directorate) Chief Admiral (R) Julio
Raygada on the organization and current direction of Sendero
Luminoso (SL). Raygada had served as the Acting Director of
National Intelligence for over a year while Peru's
intelligence systems were undergoing reorganization, and he
became the permanent DINI head after the regulations on
Peru's new National Intelligence System (SINA) were published
in the Official Gazette on January 4. On 2/2, Raygada gave
D/Polcouns an expanded version of the SL briefing, the
salient points of which follow.

3. (S) Although he stressed at the outset that he does not
equate Peru's situation with Colombia's, Raygada expressed
concern about the growth of coca cultivation here. DINI
believes that coca cultivation has grown from 44,000 hectares
in 2004 to 56,000 hectares currently. In addition, the
density of cultivation has increased, especially in
non-traditional areas, meaning that the potential for cocaine
production in Peru has increased by an even greater margin.
Traffickers export coca paste and cocaine with relative ease
using medium to large ocean-going vessels, departing in many
cases from the southern coast of Peru. Areas of intense coca
cultivation, in particular the Monzon Valley, have become in
essence liberated areas, with little state presence. Groups
with political agendas, not just SL but also Ollanta Humala's
Nationalist Party and the Peruvian Communist Party, are
attempting to portray themselves as the advocates of coca
producers.

4. (S) Although Raygada sees SL as collaborating with the
narcotics trade in ways that are similar to Colombia's FARC,
he does not believe that the Senderistas have morphed into
"narco-terrorists." He thinks instead that SL continues to
adhere to many of its own distinct tactics and long-term
objectives. SL does not maintain a uniformed standing army.
SL tactics in recent fatal attacks (Refs) have tended even
more toward their traditional approach of putting together a
temporary strike force that carries out an operation and goes
back to civilian cover. SL intends to use this technique to
increase the pace of its "popular war," eventually carrying
this struggle from the countryside to the cities. There are
indications that Sendero is reviving its practice of
selective assassinations, and of armed take-overs of villages
to capture and gather information on opponents.

5. (S) SL is also undergoing renewed efforts to fortify its
infrastructure and bases of support. 10,057 persons accused
or convicted of terrorist activity were released from jail
between 1982 and 2005, and many have retained their
connection with SL. Raygada believes that SL has 2,000
active members at present, although just a few hundred are
armed combatants. SL documents recently seized by the police
refer to the group's historic and doctinaire view of their
struggle to come to power. The documents make reference to
the "Fight on Two Fronts" (i.e. armed and political,
abbreviated as L2L in Spanish), and to passing into the
"Fourth Phase" (NFI) of SL's revolution against the Peruvian
State.

6. (S) SL's political strategy is to organize "pockets" of
activity: reinvigorated regional committees in the north,
south, central highlands, Huallaga Valley and metropolitan
Lima; "popular committees" engaged in fund-raising in 70
villages throughout the coca zone; control of Peruvian
Popular Aid (Socorro Popular del Peru), an NGO that was
initially created to support families of prisoners;
infiltration of rural peasant patrols (groups originally
created to oppose Sendero) in coca-growing areas;
infiltration of the radio broadcast industry, in particular
in the northern cone of Lima; and positioning members in key
positions in universities and in the national teachers union.
Raygada also alleged that NGOs such as the Legal Defense
Institute (IDL) and Living Justice (Justicia Viva), which
have received Embassy funding support, are knowing advocates
of Sendero.

7. (S) Militarily, the SL combatants in the north (Huallaga
Valley) are well organized in columns SL refers to as "mobile
networks" of 12 to 30 individuals. These groups prey upon
the economic activity (licit and illicit) along the Belaunde
and Basadre Highways. There are three different groups of SL
combatants in the south (Apurimac and Ene Valleys). These
groups are more widely separated than those in the north, and
tend to live in jungle camps, rather than under cover in
villages (as in the north). Besides "assessments" (cupos)
for protecting narcotics trafficking, the SL combatants in
both regions receive money from illegal loggers, fuel
smugglers, fruit growers and sugar producers. DINI recently
received information that SL had gotten $10,000 (possibly a
loan) from the Peruvian Communist Party. DINI believes SL
has also solicited funds from the FARC.


POWERS




TEXTO DE REFERENCIA: Cable sobre el contrato de un experto en defensa israelí


En 2009, la Embajada de Lima informa de que el gobierno de Perú ha suscrito un contrato con un experto en defensa israelí por nueve millones de dólares

ID:

235679

Date:

2009-11-19 18:50:00

Origin:

09LIMA1659

Source:

Embassy Lima

Classification:

CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN

Dunno:

09LIMA1209 09LIMA1299 09LIMA1647 09LIMA1653

Destination:

VZCZCXYZ0018
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHPE #1659/01 3231850
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 191850Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY LIMA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0120
INFO RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION
RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 0052
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ
RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO
RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO


C O N F I D E N T I A L LIMA 001659

SIPDIS
NOFORN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019/11/19
TAGS: PTER, SNAR, SOCI, PGOV, MOPS, PE
SUBJECT: Sendero Luminoso: Incremental Gains in Mixed Picture

REF: LIMA 1209; LIMA 1299 AND PREVIOUS; LIMA 1647; LIMA 1653

CLASSIFIED BY: P. Michael McKinley, Ambassador; REASON: 1.4(B), (D)

1. (C) Summary. Most analysts believe Sendero Luminoso (SL)
insurgents are making incremental gains in the Apurimac-Ene River
Valley (VRAE). Local observers in Ayacucho say frustrations with
government at every level have strengthened the anti-system
opposition and in some cases generated sympathy for SL. In the
most recent incident, SL elements attacked a provisional military
base in the VRAE on November 5, killing one soldier and injuring
four others. According to senior-level GOP officials, quashing SL
in the VRAE remains a top government priority, and recent efforts
include signing a $9 million contract with an Israeli defense
specialist. Several SL members have expressed interest in
participating in elections, but most politicians still see an
association with the organization as a kiss of death. End summary.



SL Expanding Influence in Ayacucho

-------------------------------------------

2. (C) While there have been fewer casualties in the VRAE this
year so far than last, according to Peruvian military sources, most
analysts believe SL in the VRAE and environs is a growing threat.
For one, the terrorist group has likely gained firepower over the
past several years, fueled mostly by weapons stolen from security
forces in recent attacks (refs). Observers have also told us SL's
VRAE faction is particularly dangerous now because of its deceptive
tactics. Whereas SL in the 80s was often gruesomely violent with
villagers and grassroots organizations, today's incarnation now
actively befriends and financially supports communities, in some
cases seeking to supplant a state that has abandoned them.
Several contacts in Ayacucho (where SL founder Abimael Guzman was a
university professor) recently told us that Jose's "proseguir"
faction in the VRAE has successfully branded itself as a kinder,
gentler group, and is at least tacitly accepted by rural
communities and by the very self-defense committees that played a
pivotal role in the original SL's defeat.



3. (C) During a recent visit to Ayacucho, local contacts told us
that general discontent and disillusionment with the government,
and a particular distaste for the ruling APRA party, had expanded
and deepened popular sympathy for "anti-system" alternatives. In
some cases, movements that have espoused or used violence such as
the "Etnocaceristas" (headed by Antauro Humala, who is currently
serving a 25 year prison sentence for instigating a 2005 armed
uprising in Andahuaylas) and SL itself have benefited from these
anti-government sentiments. Several contacts told us that when
Guzman's attorney Alfredo Crespo visited Ayacucho in September to
tout Guzman's recently published book, he was warmly received by
local radio stations, print media and university student groups.
Others told us that pervasive corruption amongst local politicians
made some people feel nostalgia for the days when SL would kill
corrupt politicians as a warning to others. Several observers said
that, with education, health, and employment opportunities sorely
lacking, disgruntled locals willingly joined local defense fronts -
whose leaders often have ideological ties with SL - in strikes and
protests. In addition, jobless youth from the highlands frequently
work stints as "burriers" for drug traffickers, who are deeply
intertwined with SL in the VRAE.



November 5 Attack
------------------------

4. (C) The most recent VRAE attack occurred on November 5, when
one soldier was killed and four others wounded during a four-hour
assault by Shining Path (SL) terrorists on a provisional military
base located where the Vizcatan and Mantaro rivers meet. SL forces
were repelled after attempting to overrun the base, which was

manned by 45 soldiers from the 2nd Infantry Brigade. According to
VRAE Military Region sources, the SL's motive was probably to
obtain more weapons, and reflected "desperation" because it had
been unable to dislodge any of the temporary military bases set up
in the VRAE since Operation Excellence 777 began in August 2008.
Other observers maintained that the Government's recently expanded
rewards campaign for capturing SL leaders "Jose" in the VRAE and
"Artemio" in the Upper Huallaga Valley (UHV) - the bounty on both
their heads was increased from 500K to 1 million soles (roughly USD
350K) -- may have also played a part in SL's belligerence. One
prominent analyst, however, suggested that SL attacks on relatively
fortified military bases rather than security patrols or
helicopters vulnerable to ambush indicate SL was increasingly well
equipped and regaining strength.



VRAE Remains Top Focus

------------------------------

5. (C) According to senior GOP officials, quashing SL in the VRAE
remains a top government priority. Defense Minister Rey has
emphasized his intention to refocus Peru's security efforts on the
internal threat. Media reports have alluded to the imminent
purchase of several combat-capable helicopters (the armed forces
only have about half a dozen operational helicopters, having lost
two in the last few months [refs]), suitable for operations in the
VRAE. According to government and congressional sources, the MOD
is close to obtaining around USD 130 million from the Ministry of
the Economy for VRAE operations. In a recent conversation with the
Ambassador, FM Garcia Belaunde said that, notwithstanding tensions
with Chile and an announced U.S. arms sales, the VRAE would remain
Peru's central security focus. The GOP's efforts have even
included signing a reported one year, $9 million contract with
former Israeli Brigadier General Israel Baruch Ziv, who promised to
help Peru defeat SL in the VRAE once and for all. According to
media sources, Ziv will focus on training for elite special
operations forces, strengthening intelligence networks, while
Peruvian joint forces will prioritize the killing or capture of SL
leaders rather than control of territory.



SL in Politics

---------------

6. (C) Current and former SL members have expressed interest in
participating in elections, but most politicians and parties still
see any alliance or association with SL as politically toxic. We
have heard that Guzman's attorney has publicly stated that SL would
seek to participate in the 2010 regional and 2011 national
elections. Guzman's partner and imprisoned SL leader, Elena
Iparraguirre, publicly reiterated SL's interest, and even named
Cajamarca priest, environmental activist and probable presidential
aspirant Marco Arana as a possible political ally. (Arana quickly
distanced himself publicly from Iparraguirre and SL.) Similarly, a
controversy broke out after Elsa Malpartida, Andean Community
parliamentarian representing Humala's Nationalist Party (PNP), was
reported to have belonged to SL in the 1980s. Malpartida publicly
argued that, like others in Peru's rural areas, she had been forced
to cooperate with SL and had formally severed her ties long ago.
Government officials, including Justice Minister Aurelio Pastor,
have publicly stated that SL would be prohibited from participating
in the political process because it remained a terrorist
organization that consciously used violence for political ends.



Comment: The Chile Distraction

---------------------------------------

7. (C) One problem with the continuing spy controversy that has
roiled relations between Peru and Chile (refs) is that political
calculations might compel the GOP to turn its attention (and

resources) away from the country's real and immediate internal
threat: the potentially reemerging SL terrorist threat and
unchecked drug trafficking interests, particularly in the VRAE. So
far, our Peruvian counterparts have assured us this will not
happen.
MCKINLEY


TEXTO DE REFERENCIA: Cable sobre las minas antipersona

En 2009, la Embajada de Lima pide a Washington que apruebe un programa de tecnología militar contra las minas de Sendero Luminoso

ID:

232382

Date:

2009-10-30 21:55:00

Origin:

09LIMA1620

Source:

Embassy Lima

Classification:

SECRET//NOFORN

Dunno:

09STATE92407

Destination:

VZCZCXYZ0001
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHPE #1620/01 3032155
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 302155Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY LIMA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1439
INFO RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA PRIORITY 0092
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PRIORITY 8644
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS PRIORITY 1522
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO PRIORITY 0118
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO PRIORITY 0133
RHMFISS/FBI WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEHPE/CHUSMAAG LIMA PE PRIORITY
RUMIAAA/USCINCSO MIAMI FL PRIORITY


S E C R E T LIMA 001620

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR WHA/AND, S/CT AND PM/PPA (JKNOCH AND SKWAK)
SOUTHCOM FOR KSTALEY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/29/2019
TAGS: MARR, MASS, MOPS, KTIA, PREL, PTER, PE
SUBJECT: PERU: SUPPLEMENTAL TO FY'10 1206 COUNTER-IED
PROPOSAL

REF: STATE 92407

Classified By: Ambassador P. Michael McKinley for
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

1.(S/NF) Summary: This telegram provides the Ambassador's
confirmation and additional input in support of Embassy
Lima's recent proposal for FY 200 1206 funding to establish
a Counter-Improvised Explosive Device (C-IED) program in
Peru. The proposal is designed to boost Peru's capacity to
conduct counter-terrorism operations against the Shining Path
(Sendero Luminoso - SL) terrorist organization, mainly in the
Apurimac-Ene River Valley (VRAE). SL is making effective use
of home-made, but increasingly-sophisticated IEDs and booby
traps, which are now causing the bulk of the casualties in
the VRAE. Embassy believes that the GOP is finally
demonstrating the political will necessary for a decisive
push against the SL in the VRAE. A robust C-IED program is
essential to its campaign and is likely to yield valuable
lessons-learned on C-IEDs as well as other fighting tactics
that can be applied elsewhere to save American lives. The
requested funding amount for the project is: $2,500,000.00.
End Summary.

SL Terrorist Threat
-------------------

2. (S/NF) Although SL is often labeled as a "terrorist
remnant" -- a term that can easily belie the danger behind
the incremental resurgence of Latin America's most brutal and
fanatical terrorist organization, which is responsible for
the majority of the estimated 69,000 killed in Peru during
the insurgency of the 1980s and 1990s. Despite the tendency
by some to dismiss the still small SL VRAE faction
("PROSEGUIR") as little more than narcotraffickers, several
prominent local analysts argue convincingly that this faction
maintains definite political (Maoist/Communist) aims more
akin to a genuine terrorist organization than drug smugglers.
The analysts believe that SLs primary goal is to create a
liberated area in the VRAE where it can govern in the vacuum
created by the lack of state presence. There is no doubt that
the SL has adopted a "kindlier, gentler" approach towards the
local population. In the VRAE,SL prefers to bribe peasants
and local officials, rather than to terrorize them and even
execute them, as they did in the past.

3. (S/NF) Other analysts contend that the VRAE SL may even
compete for municipal offices in the next local elections.
VRAE SL reportedly complements its military efforts in the
VRAE with political work by cadres operating in the capital
of Ayacucho region and with an extensive propaganda effort
that has adopted strident anti-US rhetoric. We also note that
some analysts here believe that SL in the Upper Huallaga
Valley (UHV) and SL in the universities and slums of Lima
merely pretend to be at odds with SL in the VRAE, but are
actually following the Marxist doctrine of "talking and
fighting" in order to confuse the enemy and while SL continue
its protracted struggle in the "long war." The fact is, no
one really knows for sure about SL's long term objectives or
how it spends its money, but given SL's bloody track record,
we should safely assume the worst from a group that espouses
the violent overthrow of Peru's democratically-elected
government.

4. (S/NF) According to SL VRAE's own writings and latest
doctrine, it now considers the USA to be its "number one
enemy", and it is willing to broaden its support with other
radical groups or narcotraffickers, peasants and corrupt
officials in order to achieve its goals. SL has scored an
impressive series of military successes against the security
forces over the last 16 months it has killed more than 51
soldiers and 25 policemen, though most of the latter in the
UHV, where SL's "Acuerdista" faction operates. Many of the
casualties in the VRAE are caused by command-detonated IED's
or home made anti-personnel blast mines and mines are

sometimes planted in coca fields in the UHV to dissuade coca
erradication. Some experts, such as Army General Carlos Paz,
head of the counter-mine unit DIGEDEHUME has told us that SL
is increasingly resorting to electronic timers and triggering
devices to actuate its IEDs and booby traps. The IEDs and
booby traps are having a significant negative impact on the
morale of the infantry soldiers who patrol the VRAE's rugged
mountain/jungle terrain.

5. (S/NF) Significant Incidents
-------------------------------

-- September 2, 2009, near the town of Sinaycocha, Santo
Domingo de Acobamba District, Huancayo Province in Junin
Region: SL forces downed a Peruvian air force (FAP) MI-17
helicopter and reportedly killed its pilot, co-pilot and one
crewman on the ground. SL blew up the aircraft after removing
its crew-served weapons and ammunition and then booby-trapped
the area. The rescue operation of a nearby pinned down patrol
was hampered by heavy small arms fire and IEDs and booby
traps implanted in the area.

-- April 9, 2009 Sanabamba, Ayacucho region: SL terrorists
ambushed two military patrols in the Vizcatan region of the
VRAE and killed thirteen soldiers. SL launched the ambush
by remotely detonating an improvised explosive device (IED)
on the side of a hill in the path of two military patrols.
After the explosion caused a rockslide that crushed some of
the soldiers in the lead patrol, the SL column attacked the
survivors with gunfire and grenades. Twelve of sixteen
troops in the lead patrol died in the initial battle. The
second patrol soon caught up and repelled the guerrillas,
losing one soldier in the combat.

-- On October 9,2008, at "Curva Sajona" in northern
Huancavelica Region: SL triggered a remotely activated
explosive device underneath a Peruvian Army truck returning
soldiers to a nearby base at Cochabamba Grande. The attackers
then opened fire from both sides of the road, killing 14
soldiers and 7 civilians. Several others were wounded, three
of them critically. It was the deadliest Sendero attack since
the 1992 capture of Sendero founder Abimael Guzman.

Receptivity
-----------

6. (S/NF) Senior Peruvian Armed Forces and civilian
leadership have expressed high interest in the C-IED Center
and program described in our 1206 request. The Commander of
Peru's Joint Command (equivalent to our Chairman of the JCS)
has directly approached the Ambassador and the Chief of MAAG
on this subject, and C-IED has been a topic of intense
interest at lower levels of engagement.

Comment
-------

7. (S/NF) There are encouraging signs that the GOP may have
finally realized that its internal threat from the SL in the
VRAE is a more clear and present danger than some
hypothetical, conventional threat from Chile or Bolivia. As a
recent Flag officer put it, "We don't want to wind up like
Colombia or Mexico." At this point, the incremental growth
of SL activities, and of the growing ties with drug
traffickers, is not on a scale with either Colombia or
Mexico. However, we don't want to get into a similar
situation given the history of SL in Peru. While we work with
our host nation counterparts to support their intelligence,
rotary wing and ground operations needs for the VRAE
campaign, the establishment of a Counter-Improvised Explosive
Device (C-IED) program stands out as a timely, pragmatic and
cost-effective solution to a very real battlefield problem.
We also believe that our engagement is likely to yield
valuable lessons-learned on IEDs, mines and booby traps, as
we capture Peru's past experiences in the 1995 Cenepa War

with Ecuador and its internal struggle against SL and MRTA as
well as the current campaign in the VRAE. We hope that
decision makers will evaluate our 1206 proposal favorably.
End Comment.
MCKINLEY


TEXTO DE REFERENCIA: Cable en el que Perú pide a EE UU equipamiento militar

En 2009, la Embajada de Lima informa de que los militares piden equipamiento aéreo y terrestre, helicópteros, y medios para construir un aeropuerto

ID:

236863

Date:

2009-11-25 20:48:00

Origin:

09LIMA1669

Source:

Embassy Lima

Classification:

CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN

Dunno:


Destination:

VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHPE #1669/01 3292049
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 252048Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY LIMA
TO RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0156
INFO RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION
RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 0067
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS
RUEHGE/AMEMBASSY GEORGETOWN
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ
RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO
RUEHPE/AMEMBASSY LIMA
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC


C O N F I D E N T I A L LIMA 001669

NOFORN
SIPDIS
SOUTHCOM FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019/11/25
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PTER, MASS, MOPS, SOCI, PE
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR USSOUTHCOM COMMANDER, GENERAL DOUGLAS M.
FRASER

CLASSIFIED BY: P. Michael McKinley, Ambassador, State, Executive;
REASON: 1.4(A), (B), (D)

1. (C/NF) Summary: Embassy Lima warmly welcomes you to Peru.
You will arrive at a time of strong GOP interest in expanding
security cooperation with the United States. Under President Alan
Garcia, Peru has been a reliable U.S. partner and played a
constructive role in a complicated South America characterized by
resurgent populism and periodic flashes of tension -- most recently
between Colombia and Venezuela. Notwithstanding its recent strong
economic growth and falling poverty levels, Peru still faces real
security threats, primarily relating to drug trafficking and
reemerging Shining Path terrorism. Your visit affords an
opportunity to underscore our interest in supporting the GOP's
efforts to combat these threats in the several discrete areas where
we are best positioned to help. Peruvian sensitivities regarding
U.S. Arms Sales to Chile, although overshadowed by allegations of
Chilean espionage, remain acute and are likely to figure
prominently in your meetings here. End Summary.



Peru: A Good Friend in the Region

2. (C) We have built a strong bilateral relationship with Peru
in recent years, partly embodied in the Peru Trade Promotion
Agreement (PTPA). We also share a similar strategic vision, namely
that the region's foremost security threats originate from
transnational and non-state criminal actors such as
narco-traffickers and terrorists, as well as resurgent populism and
the meddling of Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez and his allies.
At the same time, we have sought to support Peru's efforts to
address the underlying causes of these threats -- including
persistent (if falling) poverty, corruption and social inequality
-- and to spread the benefits of economic development more widely.
We have also sought to support Peru's plan to reorient its security
posture away from its perceived conventional threats from its
neighbors (mainly Chile) and to modernize its military's doctrines
and retool its operational capabilities to confront its internal
threats. The GOP sees the U.S. as an ally and has asked for our
help. Despite our broadly shared interests, however, domestic and
regional sensitivities about a too close military-security embrace
with the United States persist.



3. (C) The GOP has played a constructive role in the region and
sees challenges and opportunities through a similar policy prism.
Under Garcia, Peru has helped to counter Bolivia and Venezuela's
efforts to blame the U.S. for rising regional tensions. In the
recent UNASUR President's meeting in Bariloche, for example, Garcia
vigorously defended Colombia's sovereign right to work formally
with the U.S. in combating drug trafficking and terrorism by means
of the Defense Cooperation Agreement ( DCA). Peru was active in
helping defuse the Colombia-Ecuador crisis in March 2008, and
continues to seek to help repair and restore relations between
those two countries. (Note: Colombian Embassy officials here have
told us that Peru is Colombia's "only ally" in the region." End
Note.) President Garcia's recent "Peace and Security Cooperation"
initiative appears to be a serious attempt to promote regional
stability and contain defense costs at a time of global economic
recession. Garcia's proposals seek to prevent an arms race in the
region, reduce military expenditures, formalize a non-aggression
pact and field a regional defense force ("Fuerza Sudamericana de
Paz e Intervencion").



4. (C) Peru's relations with Chile have been rocky following
Peru's decision to take its maritime border dispute with Chile to
the International Court of Justice in early 2008. Ties soured
further following Peruvian complaints over Chile's "Salitre 2009"
war games and have grown even tenser in the wake of allegations of
Chilean spying. Relations with Bolivia have also been strained
over alleged Bolivian political meddling, and personal insults
between Presidents Garcia and Morales. The GOP remains concerned

that Venezuela is trying to sow instability in the region through
its covert support of radical and indigenous groups in Peru and
elsewhere. Peru's robust engagement with (its former enemy)
Ecuador represents its greatest diplomatic success to date, which
MFA officials have told us is their "number one" foreign policy
objective. Peru has signed onto Brazil's UNASUR South American
integration plan and it desires a "strategic relationship" with
Brazil, focused on integrating infrastructure such as the new
inter-oceanic highways and investment. While it has respectful
relations with other countries in the region, Peru feels a special
kinship with Colombia for their similar drug trafficking and
terrorism challenges and their shared view that free trade and
openness to investment are the best way to foment economic growth
and advance national development.



Peru's Security Challenges and Threats

5. (C) Notwithstanding its recent strong economic growth and
generally falling poverty levels, Peru faces a series of largely
internal security challenges that could threaten its stability and
continued progress. Social conflict is one, and the June 5
violence in the northern Amazon city of Bagua in which 24 policemen
and 10 civilians were killed was the government's most serious
crisis to date. While a series of government miscalculations and
missteps was largely to blame, radical and possibly foreign
interference also played a role. That said, Peruvian military
officials are likely to focus their discussions with you on the
security challenges connected with drug trafficking and terrorism.
GOP briefings to U.S. officials tend to downplay or omit perceived
external threats to Peru such as Chile or Bolivia, but military
planning, doctrine, force structure and spending remain (in our
view) disproportionately focused on such threats.



6. (C/NF) Many analysts believe that SL, and its expanding
connections with drug trafficking, is Peru's primary security
threat - particularly in the VRAE. While there is continuing
debate about whether SL has abandoned its ideological struggle and
become just another narco-trafficking group, or rather adapted its
approach to the historical realities of the day while maintaining
its essentially political goals, the fact is that we know little
about its true intentions. Peru's own intelligence apparatus, in
disrepair since the collapse of the Fujimori regime, has only
recently begun to rebuild its capabilities. What is known is that
the SL threat was contained but not eliminated and may now again be
expanding. Over the past 18 months, terrorists have killed over 50
security forces, mostly in ambushes on isolated military patrols
but in some cases in direct assaults on provisional military bases
established as part of a targeted military operation in the heart
of SL terrain. Additionally, SL members have conducted civic
actions to gain the sympathy of local people and communities that
have been largely abandoned by the state.



Where the U.S. Can Help

7. (C/NF) Your visit affords an opportunity to underscore USG
interest in supporting the GOP's efforts to combat these threats in
the several discrete areas where we are best positioned to help.
The key word, however, is "supporting." In this context, the GOP
needs to develop a more effective political/military strategy for
turning the tide against a reemerging SL increasingly intertwined
with drug trafficking. We can help the GOP to fine-tune its plans,
but government leaders must demonstrate the political will by
committing funds, setting goals and benchmarks, and decisively
moving forward on implementation. There have been some encouraging
signs in this respect.

8. (C/NF) If an effective counternarcotics campaign and broader
development objectives in the VRAE presuppose security, the most
critical security need in the VRAE is for improved intelligence.
In this connection, the GOP is seeking to rebuild its human
collection capabilities. They also seek help in the area of
electronic intelligence, particularly to see from above the dense
jungle canopy. To seize the initiative and carry the fight to the
SL, Peru's Armed Forces also seek support in training, equipment
and transport. After extensive discussions at all levels, the GOP
may ask for the USG to assist it in the three following areas:



--- Help improve Peru's intelligence capabilities by providing
FLIR, UAVs, and satellite imagery;



--- Replace, replenish or repair their moribund helicopter fleet
and;



--- Support the construction of a fixed-wing airfield in Pichari
and supply equipment and training, including on countering SL's
increased use of home-made IEDs, mines and booby traps.



While Peru's security forces have welcomed a broad USG-led ("Tiger
Team") security review of their existing capabilities and threats,
you should be prepared to discuss our ability to support, in these
several discrete ways, Peruvian efforts to confront its real and
immediate internal security threats in the VRAE.



Tensions with Chile: Distracting the Focus

9. (C/NF) Peruvian sensitivities regarding U.S. Arms sales to
Chile remain acute. The announced prospective U.S. sale to Chile
of a Sentinel Radar system, a land to air defensive platform
(Avenger) with stinger missiles, and 100 AMRAAM missiles to equip
the 18 F-16s Chile recently purchased from Holland caused rankles
in Peru, particularly as the government was then actively and very
publicly promoting its "Peace And Disarmament" initiative with
leaders around the region. That announcement has been overshadowed
by allegations that a Peruvian Air Force NCO had been spying on
Chile's behalf for the past 5 years - allegations that have
dominated Peru's media for the past 10 days and sent its relations
with Chile into a tailspin. Still, the U.S. arms sales are present
in the minds of Peruvian political and military leaders, as tilting
the military balance even more decisively in favor of Chile, and
are likely to figure prominently in your meetings here.
MCKINLEY



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